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Abstract
This paper presents IBFT, a simple and elegant Byzantine fault-
tolerant consensus algorithm that is used to implement state machine
replication in the Quorum blockchain. IBFT assumes a partially syn-
chronous communication model, where safety does not depend on any
timing assumptions and only liveness depends on periods of synchrony.
The algorithm is deterministic, leader-based, and optimally resilient
- tolerating f faulty processes out of n, where n ≥ 3f + 1. During
periods of good communication, IBFT achieves termination in three
message delays and has O(n2) total communication complexity.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present Istanbul BFT (IBFT), a Byzantine fault-
tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithm that is used for implementing
state-machine replication in the Quorum blockchain. Quorum is an
open source permissioned blockchain platform. It is based on Ethereum
and designed for enterprise applications.
IBFT was initially proposed informally in EIP-650 [20]. That first
proposal had safety issues where two correct processes could decide dif-
ferent values. A revision addressed these safety issues but introduced
liveness issues where some executions could lead to a deadlock [10, 23].
This paper offers a precise and correct description of the algorithm
along with correctness proofs, solving both the liveness and safety is-
sues of earlier versions. Saltini et al. provide an alternative solution
to the correctness issues in the initial IBFT proposal by applying the
PBFT protocol [7] to a blockchain application [24].
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Communication Complexity Latency
Normal Case View Change Message Delays
DLS [13] O(n4) O(n4) O(n)
PBFT [7] O(n2) O(n3) 3
Zyzzyva [16] O(n) O(n3) 1 / 3∗
Spinning [27] O(n2) O(n3) 3
SBFT [15] O(cn)† O(n2) 5 / 7
HotStuff [28] O(n) O(n) 8
IBFT (Sec. 4) O(n2) O(n2) 3
Table 1: Performance of related algorithms when communication is timely. Mes-
sage delays for dual-mode protocols are shown as x / y where x is for the optimistic
environment and y otherwise.
∗Zyzzyva requires, for the slow path, waiting for the maximum network delay ∆
in addition to the 3 message delays. Additionally, its fast path has known
correctness issues [1].
†O(fn) if applying the recommended heuristic. See Section 2 for context.
IBFT belongs to a class of BFT algorithms that assume a partially
synchronous communication model [13]. Under this model messages
can be arbitrarily delayed, but the system is characterized by also hav-
ing periods of good communication in which messages are timely de-
livered. The IBFT algorithm is deterministic, leader-based, and opti-
mally resilient - tolerating f faulty processes out of n, where n ≥ 3f+1
[21]. During periods of good communication, IBFT achieves termina-
tion in three message delays and has a communication complexity of
O(n2).
IBFT follows from the line of work started with PBFT [7], which
was the first practical algorithm designed for this model. More re-
cently, a number of consensus algorithms have been proposed under
the same class with the aim of being used specifically in blockchain
systems [4, 5, 15, 28].
Table 1 shows the communication complexity and latency to reach
a decision for different algorithms under this class. The communica-
tion complexity is the asymptotic upper bound on the total number
of bits exchanged by the algorithm. The latency is the number of
message delays incurred by a correct process until termination. Both
metrics pertain for a period of synchrony in which messages are timely
delivered.
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IBFT minimizes worst-case latency (i.e., the number of messages
delays to termination without optimistic assumptions about the envi-
ronment). It achieves termination in three message delays - matching
PBFT, Zyzzyva, and Spinning - while improving on the communica-
tion complexity of these algorithms by exchanging a quadratic number
of messages. HotStuff achieves linear communication complexity but
it does so at a high cost in latency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the related work. Section 3 defines the system model. Section 4
describes the IBFT algorithm in detail. Section 5 proves the correct-
ness of IBFT. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
The problems of consensus and state machine replication (SMR) are
closely associated with one another. Consensus requires processes in
a distributed system to reach agreement on some value [26]. SMR
requires agreement on a total order of commands [17, 25]. When
consensus is solvable, so is SMR. As such, consensus is often used as
a building block to implement SMR.
The problem of a distributed system reaching agreement in the
presence of Byzantine process failures was first devised by Pease et
al. [19, 21]. They also propose solutions for synchronous systems,
where there is a known bound on the message transmission delays
and the relative speeds of processes.
Of more practical utility are solutions to the problem of consen-
sus in asynchronous systems, where there are no timing assumptions.
Fischer et al., however, proved there there is no deterministic solu-
tion to consensus in asynchronous system where a single process is
allowed to fail [14]. There is an abundant body of research dedicated
to circumventing this impossibility result using different techniques.
The most notable examples being partial synchrony [12, 13], failure
detectors [2, 8], and randomization [3, 9, 22].
In this paper, we are concerned with implementing Byzantine fault-
tolerant state machine replication in a partially synchronous system.
We thus restrict our comparison to protocols that, like IBFT, assume a
partially synchronous model, tolerate Byzantine process failures, and
are optimally resilient (i.e., n ≥ 3f + 1).
The partially synchronous model was introduced by Dwork et
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al. [13]. Along with it, they also proposed a Byzantine fault-tolerant
consensus algorithm (DLS), which, although inefficient, proved that
the problem has a solution in partially synchronous systems.
The PBFT algorithm was the first to provide a correct solution
for state machine replication with Byzantine faults in a partially syn-
chronous system where safety does not depend on timing assump-
tions [7]. This work was seminal in that it inspired a long line of
algorithms that explore the design space within the same partially
synchronous model.
The Zyzzyva algorithm introduced the idea of using speculative
execution to improve performance [16]. Replicas optimistically adopt
the order proposed by the primary and delegate to the clients the
detection of inconsistencies, which help replicas resolve their state to
one that is consistent with a total ordering of requests. Clement et al.
later showed that this approach suffers from significant performance
problems if even a single malicious client is present in the system [11].
As a solution, they propose a new algorithm - Aardvark - that makes
more robust design decisions at a cost of best-case performance. More
recently, Abraham et al. also demonstrated safety violations in the
optimistic execution of Zyzzyva [1].
Spinning was the first algorithm to use a rotating leader replica [27],
a concept later applied by many blockchain-motivated BFT algo-
rithms. The leader replica is changed after every request execution
instead of only when it is suspected to have failed.
More recently, we have seen a new wave of protocols that are mo-
tivated by their application to blockchain systems. We highlight Ten-
dermint, SBFT, and HotStuff.
Tendermint is a protocol whose main novelty is that it does not
have a separate round (i.e., view) change algorithm [4]. Replicas
change to a new round r+1 as part of the normal operation by reach-
ing a decision on round r. Similarly to Spinning, this allows for leader
rotation as part of the normal operation and not just when a leader
is suspected to be faulty. The main drawback of Tendermint is that
even if a round has timely communication and an honest leader, it
does not guarantee that a decision will be reached within that round.
This is because if a correct process is locked on a block b that is not
the one being proposed, then the algorithm needs to keep advancing
the view until it reaches one where the leader proposes b. This results
in a total communication complexity of O(n3) and latency of O(n).
SBFT is a dual-mode protocol, employing a faster optimistic pro-
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tocol - inspired by Zyzzyva - when there are no faulty replicas and
the system is synchronous, and a slower fallback protocol - similar to
PBFT - otherwise [15]. SBFT makes use of the concept of a collec-
tor. During a communication round, each replica, instead of broad-
casting its message, sends it to a designated replica that aggregates
the messages from all replicas into a single message and broadcasts
it. Messages are signed using threshold signatures, which allow for
the aggregated message to have a constant size. Since a single slow
or failed collector would be sufficient to make the system switch to
the fallback, slower protocol, SBFT allows the optimistic protocol to
tolerate a parameterized number c of slow or failed replicas out of
n = 3f + 2c + 1. Thus, for any c > 0, the algorithm fails to achieve
optimal resiliency. SBFT has O(cn) communication complexity dur-
ing the normal case and O(n2) complexity during view changes. If c
is a constant, then this results in linear complexity during the normal
case. It is unlikely, however, for c to remain a constant value as a
system scales. The authors recommend c ≤ f/8 as a good heuristic,
in which case the communication complexity would be O(fn).
HotStuff is another protocol that employs the concept of a col-
lector combined with threshold signatures to reduce communication
complexity [28]. Unlike SBT, however, it only uses the primary replica
as the collector. Like Tendermint, HotStuff does not employ a sepa-
rate view change protocol. Instead, the view is advanced as part of
the normal execution. This allows it to achieve O(n) communication.
The trade-off is a higher number of message delays to reach a decision.
3 System Model
The system is composed by a known set of n processes Π = {p1, p2, ..., pn}.
A process that follows the algorithm is said to be correct. Otherwise,
it is said to be faulty. A faulty process can behave in an arbitrary (i.e.,
Byzantine) way, including sending purposely wrong messages with the
intent to obviate the correct execution of the algorithm. The number
of faulty processes is constrained to f , such that n ≥ 3f + 1
We assume a partially synchronous system, where there is an un-
known upper bound ∆ on execution and communication delays that
holds after an unknown period of time called global stabilization time
(or GST, for short) [13].
Processes communicate by sending messages over a network. Any
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message sent before GST can be arbitrarily delayed or lost by the
network. Reaching GST, we assume the following: a message sent by
a correct process at some time t, such that t ≥ GST , is guaranteed to
be delivered by all correct processes by time t + ∆. For convenience
sake, each process has access to a broadcast primitive that sends a
message to every process in Π, including itself.
4 The IBFT Algorithm
We present the IBFT pseudocode in algorithms 1 to 4. The pseu-
docode depicts how a consensus instance identified by λ is executed
by a correct process pi. Algorithm 1 has the constants, state vari-
ables, and the Start procedure, which starts a consensus instance
λ on pi. Algorithm 2 describes the normal case operation of IBFT,
which happens during periods where the leader is correct and mes-
sages are timely delivered. Algorithm 3 details how round changes
are performed, for when a leader is suspected to be faulty. Finally,
Algorithm 4 has the predicates used for message justification, which
guarantees correctness during round changes by ensuring that only
safe values are proposed.
4.1 Preliminaries
The IBFT algorithm solves the consensus problem, where all correct
processes need to decide on some common value. More formally, each
instance of IBFT guarantees the following properties:
Agreement. If a correct process decides some value v, then no cor-
rect process decides a value v′ such that v′ 6= v.
Validity. Given an externally provided predicate β, if a correct pro-
cess decides some value v, then β(v) is true.
Termination. Every correct process eventually decides.
Our validation condition deserves further explanation. It uses the
notion of external validity, originally proposed by Cachin et al. [6].
The application calling the algorithm provides an arbitrary predicate
β whose purpose is to ensure that the decided value is acceptable
within the context of the application. For instance, a blockchain im-
plementation might want to ensure that the decided value is a block
containing legitimate transactions.
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Algorithm 1 IBFT pseudocode for process pi: constants, state variables,
and ancillary procedures
1: constants:
2: pi ⊲ The identifier of the process
3: state variables:
4: λi ⊲ The identifier of the consensus instance
5: ri ⊲ The current round
6: pri ⊲ The round at which the process has prepared
7: pvi ⊲ The value for which the process has prepared
8: inputV aluei ⊲ The value passed as input to this instance
9: timer:
10: timeri
11: procedure Start(λ, value)
12: λi ← λ
13: ri ← 1
14: pri ← ⊥
15: pvi ← ⊥
16: inputV aluei ← value
17: if leader(hi, ri) = pi then
18: broadcast 〈PRE-PREPARE, λi, ri, inputV aluei〉 message
19: set timeri to running and expire after t(ri)
Algorithm 2 IBFT pseudocode for process pi: normal case operation
1: upon receiving a valid 〈PRE-PREPARE, λi, ri, value〉 message m from leader(λi,
round) such that JustifyPrePrepare(m) do
2: set timeri to running and expire after t(ri)
3: broadcast 〈PREPARE, λi, ri, value〉
4: upon receiving a quorum of valid 〈PREPARE, λi, ri, value〉 messages do
5: pri ← ri
6: pvi ← value
7: broadcast 〈COMMIT, λi, ri, value〉
8: upon receiving a quorum Qcommit of valid 〈COMMIT, λi, round, value〉 messages do
9: set timeri to stopped
10: Decide(λi, value,Qcommit)
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Algorithm 3 IBFT pseudocode for process pi: round changes
1: upon timeri is expired do
2: ri ← ri + 1
3: set timeri to running and expire after t(ri)
4: broadcast 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, ri, pri, pvi〉
5: upon receiving a set Frc of f + 1 valid 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, rj , −, −〉 messages such
that ∀〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, rj , −, −〉 ∈ Frc : rj > ri do
6: let 〈ROUND-CHANGE, hi, rmin, −, −〉 ∈ Frc such that:
7: ∀〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, rj , −, −〉 ∈ Frc : rmin ≤ rj
8: ri ← rmin
9: set timeri to running and expire after t(ri)
10: broadcast 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, ri, pri, pvi〉
11: upon receiving a quorum Qrc of valid 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, ri, −, −〉 messages such
that leader(λi, ri) = pi ∧ JustifyRoundChange(Qrc) do
12: if HighestPrepared(Qrc) 6= ⊥ then
13: let v such that (
−
, v) = HighestPrepared(Qrc))
14: else
15: let v such that v = inputV aluei
16: broadcast 〈PRE-PREPARE, λi, ri, v〉
⊲ We can omit this if we assume some mechanism external to the consensus algorithm that ensures
synchronization of decided values.
17: upon receiving a valid 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, −, −, −〉 message from pj ∧ pi has decided
by calling Decide(λi,− , Qcommit) do
18: send Qcommit to process pj
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Algorithm 4 IBFT pseudocode for process pi: message justification
1: predicate JustifyRoundChange(Qrc)
2: return
∀〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, ri, prj , pvj〉 ∈ Qrc : prj = ⊥ ∧ pvj = ⊥
∨ received a quorum of valid 〈PREPARE, λi, pr, pv〉 messages such that:
(pr, pv) = HighestPrepared(Qrc)
3: predicate JustifyPrePrepare(〈PRE-PREPARE, λi, round, value〉)
4: return
round = 1
∨ received a quorum Qrc of valid 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, round, prj , pvj〉 messages
such that:
∀〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, round, prj , pvj〉 ∈ Qrc : prj = ⊥ ∧ prj = ⊥
∨ received a quorum of valid 〈PREPARE, λi, pr, value〉 messages such that:
(pr, value) = HighestPrepared(Qrc)
⊲ Helper function that returns a tuple (pr, pv) where pr and pv are, respectively, the prepared round
and the prepared value of the ROUND-CHANGE message in Qrc with the highest prepared round
5: function HighestPrepared(Qrc)
6: return (pr, pv) such that:
∃〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, round, pr, pv〉 ∈ Qrc :
∀〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, round, prj , pvj〉 ∈ Qrc : prj = ⊥ ∨ pr ≥ prj
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Each instance λ of the algorithm proceeds in rounds. During each
round, one of the processes acts has a leader that tries to drive the
execution to a common decision by proposing a value. During a good
round, where communication is timely and the leader is not faulty
(i.e., after GST), the algorithm guarantees that all correct processes
will reach a decision. There is a function leader(λ, round) that
identifies the leader. This function can be any deterministic mapping
from λ and round to the identifier of a process as long as it allows
f + 1 processes to eventually assume the leader role.
Messages. Messages are represented as tuples enclosed in angle
brackets. There are four types of messages: PRE-PREPARE, PREPARE,
COMMIT, and ROUND-CHANGE. The first three types are of the form
〈message-type, λ, r, value〉 - where λ is the consensus instance, r
is the round, and value is the proposal value - and comprise the nor-
mal case operation of the algorithm. A ROUND-CHANGE message is of
the form 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λ, r, pr, pv〉 - where λ is the consensus
instance, r is the round, pr is the prepared round, and pv is the pre-
pared value - and is used to ensure progress when the current leader
is suspected to have failed or the communication is not timely.
State. The algorithm state is composed of five variables: the con-
sensus instance λi, the round ri, the prepared round pri, and the
prepared value pvi, and the input value inputV aluei.
The variable λi identifies the instance of the consensus algorithm
being executed. It is set upon a call to the Start procedure and it
never changes throughout the execution. When the algorithm is used
to implement state machine replication, the instances are numbered
in a total order that determines the execution of commands. In a
blockchain system, λi can correspond to the block number.
The variable ri identifies the round in which process pi is currently
on and it starts at 1.
The prepared round pri and prepared value pvi variables are, re-
spectively, the highest round and the corresponding value for which
pi has prepared. During the execution of a consensus instance λ, we
say that a process pi has prepared for a round r and a value v if it
receives a quorum of valid messages1 of the form 〈PREPARE, λ, round,
value〉. These variables are initialized with a default value ⊥, which
1We explain in the validation paragraph below what this entails.
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means that pi has not prepared yet. This mechanism is essential for
the safety of the algorithm and we explain how it works in Section 4.4.
Finally, inputV aluei is simply the value passed as input to process
pi, which is saved in this variable.
Timer. In addition to the state variables, each correct process pi
also maintains a timer represented by timeri, which is used to trigger
a round change when the algorithm does not sufficiently progress. The
timer can be in one of two states: running or expired. When set to
running, it is also set a time t(ri), which is an exponential function
of the round number ri, after which the state changes to expired.
Upon rules. The main logic of the algorithm is expressed as a set
of event-driven upon rules that are triggered when some condition is
met. These are found exclusively in Algorithms 2 and 3. While not
explicit in the pseudocode, we impose the restriction that, within an
instance of the algorithm, each upon rule is triggered at most once
for any round ri. The only exception is the last rule on Algorithm 3
(line 17), which can be triggered any number of times.
A condition necessary to trigger many upon rules is receiving a
quorum of valid messages that match a certain pattern. We say that
a process has received a quorum of valid messages if it has received
valid messages from ⌊n+f2 ⌋ + 1 different processes. For instance, the
upon rule in line 3 of Algorithm 2 is triggered when process pi re-
ceives ⌊n+f2 ⌋ + 1 valid messages from different processes that have
type PREPARE, match instance λi and round ri, and have the same
value.
Validation. A correct process only accepts a message if it consid-
ers it to be valid. To be valid, a message must carry some proof of
integrity and authentication of its sender such as a digital signature.
The external validity predicate β must also be true for the value car-
ried by the message. Furthermore, a 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λ, r, pr, pv〉
message to be valid needs for the prepared round to be smaller than
the round, i.e., pr < r.
4.2 Normal case operation.
We now explain how the algorithm works during normal case opera-
tion, i.e., in some round where communication is timely and the leader
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is correct.
For any correct process pi, an execution of an instance λ of the
algorithm begins with a call to the Start procedure (Algorithm 1,
line 11), which takes as input parameters the instance identifier λ and
an input value. The procedure then initializes the state variables and
if pi is the leader for the current round, it broadcasts a PRE-PREPARE
message proposing inputV aluei.
The remainder of the normal case operation is expressed in Algo-
rithm 2. Upon receiving a valid PRE-PREPAREmessage from the leader
for instance λi and current round ri that carries a justified
2 value, a
process pi restarts the timer and broadcasts a PREPARE message (lines
1-3).
Upon receiving a quorum of valid PREPARE messages for instance
λi and current round ri carrying the same value, a process pi updates
its prepared round pri and prepared value pvi variables to match the
value of the received messages (lines 4-7). We now say that pi has
prepared for round ri and value value. It then broadcasts a COMMIT
message carrying value.
Finally, upon receiving a quorum of valid COMMIT messages for
instance λi with the same round and value, a process pi decides by
calling an externally provided Decide function (lines 8-10).
4.3 Round changes
The previous section explains how the algorithm works under good
conditions. The algorithm, however, must be able to tolerate arbi-
trary periods where communication is untimely or the leader is faulty.
Round changes are how the algorithm ensures liveness by allowing
different processes to assume the role of a leader. The pseudocode for
round changes is expressed in Algorithm 3.
A round change is primarily triggered by the timer, which is avail-
able in each process for each consensus instance and represented by
timeri. If the algorithm has not made sufficient progress for a process
pi to decide during some round ri, then the timer will eventually ex-
pire (Algorithm 3, line 1). When this happens, pi advances to round
ri +1 and broadcasts a ROUND-CHANGE message. This message carries
the values of the prepared round pri and prepared value pvi variables,
which will be used by the new leader to select a value to propose in a
2This is explained in Section 4.4.
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PRE-PREPARE message for ri+1. We explain how this value is selected
in Section 4.4, which discusses message justification.
The upon rule at line 5 is also used for liveness. It is not strictly
required in the sense that the algorithm would still be live without
it, but it helps ensuring that processes do not wait too long before
advancing to a new round. Whenever a process pi receives a set of
f + 1 valid ROUND-CHANGE messages with any round number higher
than its current round ri, it advances to the smallest round within
that set and broadcasts a ROUND-CHANGE message.
The upon rule at line 11 starts the normal operation of the new
round by having the leader broadcast a PRE-PREPARE message. From
this point on, the algorithm resumes as specified by Algorithm 2.
Finally, the upon rule at line 17 ensures that any process pj can
catch up to a decision already made by process pi by having pi send
pj a quorum of COMMIT messages for λi.
4.4 Message Justification: Safety Across Rounds
While round changes ensure liveness, we also need to ensure that the
proposal value chosen by the leader of a new round is safe. For this,
we rely on the following property:
• If some correct process could have decided a value v at some
round r < r′, then v must be the value proposed in a PRE-PREPARE
message for round r′.
To select a proposal value that guarantees this property, the leader
process, upon receiving a quorum Qrc of ROUND-CHANGE messages for
round r′ (Algorithm 3, line 11), follows the logic expressed in lines 12-
15. If there is any message in Qrc with prepared round and prepared
value not equal to ⊥, then the leader chooses v as the prepared value
pv of the message with the highest prepared round pr among the
messages in Qrc. Otherwise, if all the messages in Qrc have prepared
round and prepared value equal to ⊥, then the leader chooses the
input value that was passed to the Start function and saved in the
inputV aluei variable.
Choosing the proposal value in this way ensures safety across
rounds. This is because if a correct process decides some value v dur-
ing a round r, then v will be chosen as the proposal value for round
r+1. To see why, say that a correct process decides v during round r.
Then, at least f +1 correct processes must have prepared for v during
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round r′. This implies that any quorum of ROUND-CHANGE messages
will have at least one message with prepared round and prepared value
set to r and v, respectively, and v will be chosen as the proposal value
if the processes follow the algorithm. Since v is the proposal value for
round r+1, it is not possible for a correct process to decide a different
value during round r + 1. A form of inductive reasoning applies for
any subsequent rounds.
While choosing the proposal value in this way ensures safety across
rounds, it is possible for a leader that is faulty to deviate from al-
gorithm and send a PRE-PREPARE message with any arbitrary value.
Likewise, any faulty process can send a ROUND-CHANGE message with
an incorrect prepared round and prepared value to try to deceive a
correct leader into choosing an unsafe proposal.
As such, to demonstrate that they are correctly constructed, these
messages need a justification. A justification is a set of other messages
that prove that the message being justified is congruent with the algo-
rithm. For example, a message 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λ, r, pr, pv〉 sent by a
process pi, which states that pi prepared for round pr and value pv, is
only congruent with the algorithm if it exists a quorum of 〈PREPARE,
λ, pr, pv〉 messages. A justification is piggybacked on the message
being justified, but it is not part of the message itself.
The predicates JustifyPrePrepare and JustifyRoundChange
in Algorithm 4 express the justification logic, which we further explain
below.
ROUND-CHANGE justification. Messages of the type ROUND-CHANGE
are justified together as a set. A correct process pi considers a quorum
Qrc of ROUND-CHANGE messages to be justified if one of the following
conditions is true:
J1 All of the messages in Qrc have prepared round and prepared value
equal to ⊥.
J2 The justification has a quorum of valid 〈PREPARE, λi, pr, pv〉 mes-
sages such that 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, r, pr, pv〉 is the message with
the highest prepared round different than ⊥ in Qrc.
PRE-PREPARE justification. A PRE-PREPAREmessage for round
1 does not need justification. For any round r > 1, a 〈PRE-PREPARE,
λ, r, value〉 message is justified if its justification has a quorum Qrc of
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ROUND-CHANGE messages such that conditions J1 or J2 are true, and
if J2 is true, then value = pv.
5 Correctness
In this section we prove the correctness of IBFT. It is organized in
three subsections, one for each property of the algorithm as specified
in Section 4.1 - agreement, validity, and termination. For improved
readability, proofs that require longer or more complex arguments are
written using the structured proof format proposed by Lamport [18].
5.1 Agreement
The proof of the agreement is structured as Lemmas 1 and 2 and
Theorem 3. Lemma 1 is used as support to prove agreement during
the same round, and Lemma 2 to prove agreement across different
rounds. Theorem 3 uses both lemmas to conclude the reasoning.
Agreement during the same round.
Lemma 1 If some correct process prepares for a value v and round r,
then no correct process prepares for a value v′ and round r such that
v′ 6= v.
For this proof we assume that a correct process has prepared for
value v at round r and we demonstrate that no correct process can
prepare for a different value v′ at the same round because there is no
quorum of PREPARE messages for v′.
1. A correct process received ⌊n+f2 ⌋+ 1 valid 〈PREPARE, λ, r, v〉 mes-
sages.
Proof: This follows from the assumption. To prepare for value
v and round r, a correct process must receive ⌊n+f2 ⌋ + 1 valid
〈PREPARE, λ, r, v〉 messages.
2. f + 1 correct processes broadcasted a 〈PREPARE, λ, r, v〉 message.
Proof: This follows from 1. If a correct process received ⌊n+f2 ⌋+1
valid 〈PREPARE, λ, r, v〉 messages, then f+1 of those messages must
be been broadcasted by correct processes.
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3. For any value v′ 6= v, at most ⌊n+f2 ⌋ valid 〈PREPARE, h, r, v
′〉
messages were broadcasted.
Proof: We have established in 2 that f+1 correct processes broad-
casted a 〈PREPARE, λ, r, v〉 message. It follows that at most ⌊n+f2 ⌋
processes could have broadcasted a 〈PREPARE, λ, r, v′〉 message.
4. Q.E.D.
Proof: This follows from 3 since to prepare for a value v′ and
round r, a correct process requires ⌊n+f2 ⌋+ 1 valid 〈PREPARE, λ, r,
v′〉 messages.
Agreement across rounds. Lemma 1 showed that no two cor-
rect processes can prepare for different values on the same round. To
prove agreement across rounds we will rely on the 2, which states that
that once f + 1 correct processes prepare for the same round r and
value v, then a PRE-PREPARE message for the subsequent round r + 1
must propose v to be justified.
Lemma 2 If f + 1 correct processes prepare for a value v and round
r, then, for any 〈PRE-PREPARE, λ, r′, v′〉 message m such that r′ > r
and v′ 6= v, JustifyPreprepare(m) must be false.
We prove this lemma by induction on r′. In the base case we
prove the statement for r′ = r+1. In the induction step we prove for
r′ > r+1 and assume that JustfifyPreprepare(m) is false for any
r′′ such that r + 1 ≤ r′′ < r′.
For both cases, the argument is constructed by demonstrating that
JustifyPreprepare must be false for any 〈PRE-PREPARE, λ, r′, v′〉
messagem. According to the definition of the predicate, JustifyPreprepare(m)
is true if there is a quorum Qrc of ⌊
n+f
2 ⌋+ 1 valid 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λ,
r+1, prj, pvj〉 messages such that one of the following two conditions
is true, which correspond to J1 and J2 from Section 4.4:
(a) ∀〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, r + 1, prj, pvj〉 ∈ Qrc : prj = ⊥ ∧ prj = ⊥
(b) There are ⌊n+f2 ⌋ + 1 valid 〈PREPARE, λ, r
′, v′〉 messages such
that v′ 6= v and (r′, v′) = HighestPrepared(Qrc)
We show, both for the base case and for the induction step, that
both (a) and (b) are false.
16
1. Base Case: r′ = r + 1
1.1. Prove: Condition (a) is false.
1.1.1. Any quorum Qrc includes some message from a
correct process that prepared for round r and value
v.
Proof: A quorum Qrc by definition has ⌊
n+f
2 ⌋ + 1
messages. Since, by assumption, f+1 correct processes
prepared for round r and value v, it follows that Qrc
must include some message from those f +1 processes.
1.1.2. Q.E.D.
Proof: By 1.1.1, Qrc has some message from a correct
process that prepared for round r and value v. It fol-
lows that ∃〈ROUND-CHANGE, λi, r + 1, prj, pvj〉 ∈ Qrc :
prj 6= ⊥ ∧ prj 6= ⊥.
1.2. Prove: Condition (b) is false.
For the proof argument, we assume that condition (b) is
true and show that it leads to a contradiction.
1.2.1. Any quorum Qrc includes some message from a
correct process that prepared for round r and value
v.
Proof: A quorum Qrc by definition has ⌊
n+f
2 ⌋ + 1
messages. Since, by assumption, f+1 correct processes
prepared for round r and value v, it follows that Qrc
must include some message from those f +1 processes.
1.2.2. r′ = r
Proof: Since we assume that condition 2 is true, r′
must be the highest prepared round value prj in a
ROUND-CHANGEmessage inQrc. By 1.2.1, some ROUND-CHANGE
message in Qrc has prepared round r, which is also the
highest prepared round value possible for the message
to be valid. It follows that r′ = r.
1.2.3. f +1 correct processes broadcasted a 〈PREPARE, λ,
r, v〉 message.
Proof: This follows from the assumption that f + 1
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correct processes prepared for round r and value v.
1.2.4. For any value v′ 6= v, at most ⌊n+f2 ⌋ valid 〈PREPARE,
h, r′, v′〉 messages were broadcasted.
Proof: This follows from 1.2.2 and 1.2.3.
1.2.5. Q.E.D.
Proof: The assumption in condition 2 that there are
⌊n+f2 ⌋+1 valid 〈PREPARE, λ, r
′, v′〉 messages is in con-
tradiction with assertion 1.2.4.
2. Induction Step: r′ > r + 1
We now reason about the induction step. We prove that, for any
〈PRE-PREPARE, λ, r′, v′〉 message m such that r′ > r+1 and v′ 6= v,
JustifyPreprepare(m) is false. For this, we use the induction
assumption, which is, for any 〈PRE-PREPARE, λ, r′′, v′〉 message m′
such that r+ 1 ≤ r′′ < r′ and v′ 6= v, JustifyPreprepare(m′) is
false.
2.1. Prove: Condition (a) is false.
Proof: The same argument as 1.1 applies here.
2.2. Prove: Condition (b) is false.
2.3. If (pr, v′) = HighestPrepared(Qrc), then pr ≥ r.
Additionally, pr < r′.
Proof: By assumption, f +1 correct processes prepared
for value v and round r. This means that any quorumQrc
has some ROUND-CHANGE message with prepared round pj
equal or higher than r. As such, for pr to be the highest
prepared round value of any message in Qrc, we must
have pr ≥ r. The assertion pr < r′ follows from the
definition of a valid ROUND-CHANGE message.
2.4. There is no quorum of 〈PREPARE, λ, r, v′〉 messages
such that v′ 6= v.
Proof: This follows from Lemma 1.
2.5. There is no quorum of 〈PREPARE, λ, r′′, v′〉 messages
such that r + 1 ≤ r′′ < r′ and v′ 6= v.
Proof: A correct process only broadcasts a 〈PREPARE, λ,
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r′′, v′〉 if it accepts a 〈PRE-PREPARE, λ, r′′, v′〉 message.
By assumption, there is no such PRE-PREPAREmessage. It
follows that it is not possible have a quorum of 〈PREPARE,
λ, r′′, v′〉 messages
2.6. Q.E.D.
Proof: In 2.3 we established that r ≤ pr < r′, and in
2.4 and 2.5 we established that there is no quorum of
PREPARE messages with value v′ 6= v for any round from
r to r′ − 1.
Agreement Property. We now use the previous two lemmas to
prove the agreement property of consensus in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Agreement) If a correct process pi decides some value
v, then no correct process pj decides a value v
′ such that v′ 6= v.
Proof: Let us assume without loss of generality that some correct
process pi is the first to decide, and decides value v during some round
r. From Lemma 1 we can deduce that no correct process can decide
v′ during r because no correct process prepares for v′ during r.
For any round r′ such that r′ > r, it follows from Lemma 2
that no correct process can decide v′ during r′ because there is no
〈PRE-PREPARE, λ, r′, v′〉messagem such that JustifyPreprepare(m)
is true. Therefore, no 〈PRE-PREPARE, λ, r′, v′〉 message is accepted by
any correct process and the algorithm does not make progress towards
a decision on v′.
5.2 Validity
Theorem 4 (Validity) Given an externally provided predicate β, if a
correct process decides some value v, then β(v) is true.
Proof: To decide, a correct process must receive a quorum of valid
〈COMMIT, λ, r, v〉 messages. A message is only considered valid if it
carries a proposal value v such that β(v) is true. As such, if a correct
process decides v, then β(v) must be true.
5.3 Termination
Theorem 5 (Termination) Every correct process decides.
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For this proof, we assume, without loss of generality, that a correct
process pi has not decided yet and demonstrate that it eventually
decides.
1. pi must eventually reach some round r (i.e., it sets ri = r and
broadcasts a 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λ, r, −, −〉 message) after GST with
a correct leader pL.
Proof: Since by assumption pi does not decide, its round timer
must keep expiring indefinitely until it reaches round r or it receives
f + 1 ROUND-CHANGE messages where r is the highest round.
We now have two cases to consider. One where some correct process
pj has already decided some value v, and one where no correct process
has decided yet.
2. Case: Some correct process pj has decided.
2.1. pj receives the 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λ, r, −, −〉 message broad-
cast by pi and sends to pi a quorum of valid COMMIT
messages for the same value v.
Proof: By 1, since after GST all messages sent by correct
processes are timely delivered.
2.2. Q.E.D.
Proof: After GST, pi must receive the quorum of valid COM-
MIT messages for value v sent pj and decide.
3. Case: No correct process has decided.
3.1. Every correct process eventually reaches round r and broad-
casts a valid 〈ROUND-CHANGE, λ, r, −, −〉 message.
Proof: The argument is the same as in step 1, but generalized
for all correct processes.
3.2. The correct leader pL broadcasts a valid and justified 〈PRE-PREPARE,
λ, r, v〉 message.
Proof: After GST, pL must receive every 〈ROUND-CHANGE,
λ, r, −, −〉 message broadcast by a correct process. Since
those messages are piggybacked with the necessary PREPARE
messages for justification, pL is able to construct a valid and
justified 〈PRE-PREPARE, λ, r, v〉 message.
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3.3. Q.E.D.
Proof: Since it is after GST, the algorithm will follow through
with its normal case operation and pi will decide v at the end
of round r.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed IBFT, a simple algorithm for the consensus
problem in Byzantine-fault tolerant systems that is implemented in the
Quorum blockchain. IBFT assumes a partially synchronous model.
With timely communication, IBFT terminates within three message
delays and has O(n2) communication complexity during both normal
case operation and round changes. To ensure safety across round
changes, IBFT relies on a justification mechanism of proposed values
that is critical in achieving quadratic communication complexity.
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